Federal infrastructure loan programs are well-positioned — for obvious and not-so-obvious reasons — to offer contingent loans for climate adaptation investment in public infrastructure projects.
Two things are certain. The first is that a lot of basic public infrastructure will need to be built, replaced or rehabilitated in the near term. The second is that these long-lived projects will be operating for decades in changing climate conditions.
These certainties create a potentially expensive uncertainty. Decisions about the benefits and costs of climate adaptation must be made when projects are designed and built. But a major input of that decision is now a moving target because the climate conditions in which the project will operate can’t be predicted with confidence. Climate systems are too complex to model precisely and there’s not enough data for accurate extrapolation yet. What’s the real chance over the next thirty or forty years of what used to be a 100-year rainfall, drought or sea-level rise event? It’s certainly going to be different than the historical baseline, but by how much? We’ll find out eventually. But by then we’ll need to live with the outcomes of infrastructure decisions that are made today. And there’s plenty of scope for expensive mistakes both in projects that are over-adapted (if conditions are closer to current baseline trends) and those that are under-adapted (if conditions are extreme).
These decisions are especially tough for public infrastructure in the US, most of which is funded at the state and local level. It’s hard enough to get people to accept higher rates or taxes to pay for basic replacements and upgrades that have certain and immediately visible value to their own community. Proposing even higher rates or taxes for additional adaptation investment that may (or may not) have value (at some point) in the future is a heavy lift that many local politicians won’t attempt. Regardless of nuanced analyses or the simple prudence of erring on the side of caution, in many cases a local consensus for funding will not be practically possible. Adaptation investment will too often be another can that gets kicked down the road.
That’s bad enough on a local level. But the impact of widespread under-adapted basic infrastructure on an aggregate national level will be much worse if extreme conditions develop due to infrastructure’s very significant direct and indirect network effects. A national undersupply of adaptation investment is the most likely result of cumulative local decisions. Accepting that outcome – or simply ignoring it — becomes in effect a gigantic national bet that the investment won’t turn out to be necessary. Are we feeling lucky?
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